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INDIA’S REMOVAL OF KASHMIR’S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS: 
AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT? 
By Gita Howard* 
ABSTRACT 
India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of its Constitution in August of 2019, 
effectively removing Kashmir’s longstanding special protection status. 
Kashmir’s special protection status provided Kashmiris with an additional 
degree of autonomy than India’s states, and its revocation left Kashmir under 
greater control of Delhi.1 Several organizations flagged human rights 
concerns regarding the sudden revocation of the region’s special protection 
status and the subsequent lockdown. This article seeks to narrowly address 
whether the removal of Kashmir’s special protection status was a violation of 
international law. This article demonstrates that although Kashmiris’ 
internal right to self-determination may serve as a theory for illegality under 
International law, the right to self-determination must be balanced against 
India’s national security interests and duty to protect. Thus, India’s removal 
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1 Delhi refers to the capital of India, the seat of the Indian Government. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN 
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND KASHMIR 
A. THE REGION OF KASHMIR PRIOR TO THE INDIA-
PAKISTAN PARTITION 
To examine whether India’s revocation of Kashmir’s special 
protection status was in breach of international law, it is necessary to 
detail the long and complex history of Jammu and Kashmir 
(interchangeably referred to as “Kashmir” or “J&K”). Today, Kashmir 
is situated in the northern region of the Indian subcontinent, bound in 
the northeast by the Uygur region of Xinjiang, to the east by Tibet and 
the Chinese-administered portions of Kashmir, to the south by Indian 
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states, to the southwest by Pakistan, and to the northwest by the 
Pakistani-administered portion of Kashmir.2 
Before the India-Pakistan partition of 1947, Kashmiris enjoyed 
relative religious and cultural harmony.3 In fact, local leaders 
described the community as kashmiriyat, a term which translates to 
“Kashmir amity,” to explain the peaceful and amicable relations 
between faiths and cultures in the region.4 Despite religious 
diversity—Islamism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—the shared Kashmiri 
identity was strong, as evidenced by the frequent blending of religious 
practices across faith lines.5 According to the 1941 Census, Muslims 
formed 72.41 percent of the population, while Hindus formed 25.01 
percent of the population in the region.6 According to a 2013 report 
from the Berkeley Center, the Kashmir Valley population was 95 
percent Muslim, the Jammu region was 67 percent Hindu, and the 
Ladakh region was Tibetan Buddhist majority at 50 percent.7 
In the early nineteenth century, the British assumed colonial 
rule over the Indian subcontinent, including the Kashmir region.8 
Once Britain assumed control over India, Britain categorized Kashmir 
as a “princely state,” or one of the autonomous regions that spanned 
the Indian subcontinent,9 and granted it quasi-autonomy.10 Notably, 
in the 1930s, parallel with the Indian independence movement, 
Kashmiris initiated a “Free Kashmir” movement for independence 
 
2 Rais Akhtar, Jammu and Kashmir, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/
Jammu-and-Kashmir (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
3 See BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., GEO. UNIV., KASHMIR: 
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY BECOMES RELIGIOUS MILITANCY 6 (2013). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Fahad Nabeel, Altering Demographics of Indian-Held Kashmir, CENTRE FOR 
STRATEGIC AND CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, (Jan. 17, 2017), https://cscr.pk/explore/
themes/politics-governance/altering-demographics-indian-held-kashmir/. 
7 BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3. 
8 Mehdi Zakerian & Negin Sobhani, International Humanitarian Laws and Laws of 
War: Kashmir, 3 INT’L STUD. J. 1, 4 (2006). 
9 Angma D. Jhala, The Indian Princely States and Their Rulers, OXFORD RESEARCH 
ENCYCLOPEDIAS, https://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/97801902
77727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-355. 
10 Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 4. 
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from the British regime.11 As the end of World War II and British 
decolonization loomed, Britain passed the Indian Independence Act.12 
Although the British and Indian National Congress advocated 
for a secular and pluralistic democracy, the All-India Muslim League, 
a political group founded in 1906 to ensure the rights of Indian 
Muslims,13 ascribed to a two-nation theory which supported dividing 
the region into two nations based on religion—Hindus in India and 
Muslims in Pakistan.14 Central to this proposition was the fear that 
Muslims could not adequately have their interests supported in a 
majority Hindu state.15 However, some scholars highlight that many 
Muslims in what became West Pakistan were not in favor of the two 
nation theory.16 
B. KASHMIR DURING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN PARTITION 
During partition, Kashmir was placed into a particularly 
difficult predicament. When British rule concluded, the unofficial 
stance was that each state was to decide whether to accede to India or 
to Pakistan.17 Initially, the then-leader of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari 
Singh, held off on making a decision and joined neither India nor 
Pakistan.18 Pakistan opposed Singh’s hold out and viewed it as 
illogical because Kashmir was a majority-Muslim state.19 Meanwhile, 
India had an interest in obtaining the Kashmir territory because it was 
an important strategic barrier between Pakistan and India.20 
Furthermore, India had concerns about the Hindu-majority parts of 




13 BRITANNICA, Muslim League, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-League 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
14 Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
15 Christine Fair, False Equivalency in the “Indo-Pakistan” Dispute, WAR ON THE 
ROCKS (June 16, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/06/false-equivalency-in-the-
indo-pakistan-dispute/. 
16 See id. 
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territory, Singh requested a standstill agreement with both India and 
Pakistan, writing two telegrams to India and Pakistan.”22 Pakistan 
telegraphed back to express assent to the standstill agreement.23 
In response, India requested additional discussions before 
signing the standstill agreement, stating that the “Government of India 
would be glad if you or some other Minister duly authorized in this 
behalf could fly to Delhi for negotiating [the] Standstill Agreement 
between [the] Kashmir Government and Indian dominion,” but no 
representative went to Delhi or concluded an agreement.24 
In October of 1947, Pakistani militias from tribal areas 
mobilized to invade Kashmir, triggering the beginning of the enduring 
Kashmir conflict and a series of three Indo-Pakistan wars.25 Regular 
Pakistani military personnel also accompanied the tribesmen during 
the invasion.26 There is a debate as to whether this invasion constitutes 
a violation of the aforementioned standstill agreement, as Pakistan 
does not take ownership for the invasion—however, research indicates 
that Pakistan gave national and provincial support to these tribesmen 
invaders.27 As the tribal invaders made their way to Srinagar, the 
largest city in Kashmir, and Singh requested India’s assistance to fend 
off the invasion,28 India agreed to defend Kashmir if in turn, Kashmir 
agreed to accede to India.29 Singh signed an instrument of accession 
on October 26, 1947, accompanied with a letter detailing his intentions 
behind the accession to the then-Governor-General of India, Lord 
Mountbatten.30 The Instrument of Accession provided: 
I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India . . . I 
hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and 
 
22 Surendra Chopra, Kashmir in the United Nations, 25 THE INDIAN J. OF POL. SCI. 
124, 126 (1964). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 5; see also Fair, supra note 15. 
26 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE (July 1, 2003). https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=1427. 
27 Fair, supra note 15. 
28 Id. 
29 Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 6. 
30 Id. 
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that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of this State 
is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.31 
The instrument of accession, while granting Jammu and 
Kashmir autonomy in its own internal and local affairs, further 
allocated several aspects of governance to India, including military 
defense, external affairs, and communications.32 However, Pakistan 
has questioned the existence of this instrument because debate exists 
about when the signed instrument of accession reached New Delhi.33 
Lord Mountbatten’s response to Singh’s letter, dated October 
27, 1947, calls into question whether the correct procedures were 
followed after the accession. The letter stated: 
My Government has decided to accept the accession of 
Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy 
that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the 
subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. It is my 
Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored 
in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s 
accession should be settled by a reference to the people.34 
From Kashmir’s accession to India onward, Pakistan has 
argued that India is holding Kashmiri Muslims captive and disputed 
the accession, while India has contended that Singh’s accession to 
India was achieved through partition, an internationally agreed upon 
practice.35 During this first Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan acquired one 
third of Kashmir’s territory, and India retained the remaining land.36 
 
31 INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, (1947), http://jklaw.nic.in/
instrument_of_accession_of_jammu_and_kashmir_state.pdf. 
32 Id. 
33 Christine, supra note 15. 
34 Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
35 BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 5. 
36 Fair, supra note 15. Pakistan ceded a portion of Kashmir to China as part of a border 
agreement, and China occupied a part of Indian Kashmir during the 1962 Indo-China 
War. Factbox – India, China’s old border dispute, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2009), https://
www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-43780820091108. 
2021 REMOVAL OF KASHMIR'S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS 499 
C. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 47 
At this point of the conflict, India took the Kashmir query to 
the United Nations (“UN”), which resulted in the UN Security Council 
Resolution 47 of 1948 (“Security Council Resolution 47”).37 The 
Security Council Resolution 47 called for a plebiscite in order to 
establish the will of the Kashmiri people.38 No plebiscite has since been 
held—a fact that Pakistan often highlights in discussions surrounding 
the Kashmir dispute.39 However, a lesser known fact is that the UN set 
forth conditions before the plebiscite could be held—conditions that 
Pakistan never fulfilled.40 The UN mandated that first, Pakistan should 
withdraw its forces: 
The Government of Pakistan should . . . secure withdrawal 
from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani 
nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for 
the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of 
such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in 
the State . . . .41 
Second, the resolution determined that once Pakistan 
withdrew its forces, India should withdraw its own forces, “[w]hen it 
is established . . . that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that 
arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, 
put into operation . . . a plan for withdrawing their own forces from 
Jammu and Kashmir…”42 And thirdly, once the two prior conditions 
were met, the resolution established that the Government of India 
should issue a plebiscite.43 
Consequentially, though it is often mentioned that India never 
issued a plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiri people under 
the Security Council Resolution, it is rarely explained that Pakistan 
failed to meet the first prerequisite under the resolution, a necessary 
 
37 See Security Council Res. 47, U.N. Doc. S/RES/47 (1948) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 
47]. 
38 See id.; see also Fair, supra note 15. As discussed earlier, this plebiscite was first 
established by Lord Mountbatten, and then carried on by the UN. 
39 Fair, supra note 15. 
40 Id. 
41 S.C. Res. 47, supra note 37, at 4. 
42 Id. at 5. 
43 Id. at 5-6. 
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condition for the plebiscite—the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from 
Kashmir.44 In 1956, Indian Prime Minister Jarwharlal Nehru offered 
the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, a plebiscite for 
the whole of Kashmir, but Pakistan ultimately rejected the offer.45 
Furthermore, to this day, Pakistan has never withdrawn its forces—a 
fact that is often overlooked by the world media, governments, and 
human rights organizations.46 Moreover, it is arguable whether the 
plebiscite is relevant today, as the demographics in Kashmir have 
altered dramatically as a result of ensuing conflict.47 
D. INTEGRATING KASHMIR INTO INDIA’S LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
After Security Council Resolution 47 was issued in 1948, India 
implemented legislation to legalize the status of Kashmir within its 
national framework. In 1952, India formed an agreement with 
Kashmir, known as the Delhi Agreement, which provided, “that 
sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the Instrument 
of Accession continues to reside in the state,” and further affirmed the 
State’s authority to establish permanent residents’ rights and 
privileges.48 To give effect to the Delhi Agreement, India enacted 
Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution.49 
Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution granted the 
region its special protection status. Article 370 came into effect in 1949 
exempting Kashmir from the Indian Constitution with exception to 
 
44 See id.; see also Fair, supra note 15. 
45 Political turmoil during this period, as well as pressure from militant and aspiring 
leader, Ayub Khan, contributed to this decision. See Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 
8. 
46 See Aarti Tikoo, Pak-sponsored terror in Kashmir ‘ignored and overlooked” by 
human rights activists: TOI journalist at US Congressional hearing, TIMES OF INDIA 
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pak-sponsored-terror-in-
kashmir-ignored-and-overlooked-by-human-right-activists-toi-journalist-at-us-
congressional-hearing/articleshow/71714515.cms. 
47 See INDIA TODAY, Kashmir: Curious case of demographic realities and perceptions 
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/kashmir-curious-
case-of-demographic-realities-and-perceptions-1582376-2019-08-19. 
48 See L. Ali Khan, India Complicated the Kashmir Dispute, JURIST (Aug. 30, 2019), 
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/08/l-ali-khan-india-kashmir-dispute/. 
49 Id. 
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modifications made by the president and presidential order,50 and 
granted Kashmir the jurisdiction to create its own laws, aside from 
laws specified in the Instrument of Accession relating to finance, 
defense, foreign affairs, and communications.51 Article 370 also 
established a separate Kashmir constitution and flag and denied 
property rights to non-residents of the region.52 In 1954, Article 35A, 
also known as “the Permanent Residents Law,”53 allocated power to 
the Kashmir legislative assembly to determine who may be a 
permanent resident of the region, and granted particular special rights 
and privileges to Kashmir citizens relating to property, public aid, and 
welfare programs, as well as public sector jobs.54 Because Article 35A 
permitted Kashmir to define permanent residents and determine their 
rights, the J&K legislature was also able to limit women’s property 
rights, such that once women married outside nonpermanent 
residents, they lost their permanent resident rights to inherit or own 
property.55 Moreover, some caste communities that came to Kashmir 
as migrant laborers have also been discriminated against under 
Articles 370 and 35A, and have been unable to benefit from welfare 
programs and opportunities.56 Thus, some have criticized Articles 370 
and 35A because of their discriminatory impact.57 
 
50 Tariq Ahmad, FALQs: Article 370 and the Removal and Kashmir’s Special Status, 
L. LIBR. OF CONG. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2019/10/falqs-article-370-
and-the-removal-of-jammu-and-kashmirs-special-status/. 
51 Kashmir special protection status explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?, 




54 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Update of the 
Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-
Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019, (July 8, 2019), at para. 54. 
55 Akanksha Khullar, Women’s Rights and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation 
Act, 2019, INST. OF PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. (Dec. 24, 2019), http://www.ipcs.org/
comm_select.php?articleNo=5639. 
56 See Pallavi Sareen, The Constitution is Allowing the Continued Discrimination of 
Valmikis in J&K, THE WIRE (June 28, 2019), https://thewire.in/rights/jammu-and-
kashmir-article-35a-valmikis. 
57 Khullar, supra note 55. 
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E. ENDURING CONFLICT IN KASHMIR 
Despite the implementation of Articles 370 and 35A, conflict 
over Kashmir still persisted. Pakistan waged a second war against 
India over Kashmir from April to September of 1965, where Indian 
forces defeated Pakistan.58 Since the conclusion of this second war, 
India and Pakistan have steadier control over locations with a military 
advantage—India holds the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh 
regions, whereas Pakistan has maintained control over the Azad 
Kashmir region as well as Gilgit-Baltistan.59 In 1999, a third war 
ensued over Kashmir, also referred to as the Kargil Conflict.60 There, 
Pakistani military units infiltrated the Kargil region, but were 
ultimately deterred by Indian troops and international pressure.61 
Religious tensions fueled much of the most recent war with Pakistan 
leaders resisting the secularization of society through the 
implementation of a national Islamization program in Pakistan, and an 
increasing popularity of Hindu nationalists within the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (“BJP”), a right wing political party which has historically 
reflected Hindu nationalist ideology.62 
Militant activity has greatly contributed to instability in the 
Kashmir region. In response to disputed elections and general failures 
of Indian governance in 1989, Pakistani militants initiated an 
insurgency against Indian forces across the line of control.63 The Indian 
Government responded with “harsh counterinsurgency operations 
that further alienate[d] much of the Muslim population of the Kashmir 
Valley.”64 Militant attacks on Indian forces as well as civilians caused 
a major exodus of Hindu Pandits, a Brahmin caste that was a 
privileged minority prior to partition.65 Although numbers vary, it is 
 
58 See Fair, supra note 15; see also BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD 
AFFS., supra note 3, at 9. 
59 BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 5. 
63 See id. at 9. 
64 See id. 
65 The Hindu pandits had made up the majority of Hindus in Kashmir until the conflict 
in 1989—since then many have been killed and many have fled sectarian violence. 
See BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9. 
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estimated that 350,000 Pandits were forced to flee their homes 
following threats from Islamist militants in the valley.66 Some figures 
estimate that today, 200,000 to 300,000 Pandits are living in exile as a 
result of targeted killings to ethnically cleanse Pandits from the 
region.67 Militant activity has been fueled in large part by Pakistan, as 
it has been verified that Pakistan has provided arms to militants who 
train on their side of the line of control.68 However, some have also 
speculated that India has supported Baloch and Sindhi nationalists 
who sought independence from Pakistan, although those allegations 
remain unverified.69 Regardless of who is to blame for militant 
activity, a staggering amount of violence has been committed by 
militant groups in Kashmir—it has been reported that anywhere from 
30,000 to 100,000 civilians have been killed.70 
Unique geopolitical and religious factors have only fueled 
tensions post-partition. The rise of violence in the Kashmir region can 
be attributed to several factors including the strong presence of Indian 
military forces, and Islamic militant violence.71 Jihadists have also 
entered the region with the Pakistani Government supporting their 
actions.72 As a report from Georgetown University’s Berkeley Center 
for Religion, Peace & World Affairs (“Berkeley Center”) noted, 
“Jihadist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed were a useful tool for the 
Pakistani Government: they effectively challenged Indian control of 
Kashmir, provoked harsh repressive measures from the Indian 
military, and allowed the regular Pakistani military to gain distance 
from frontline hostilities.”73 Moreover, tensions between India and 
Pakistan are particularly heated because they are both nuclear 
powers.74 
 
66 Sudha Ramachandran, Can Kashmir’s Pandits Ever Return Home?, The Diplomat 
(Feb. 26, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/can-kashmirs-pandits-ever-return-
home/. 
67 BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9. 
68 Id. 
69 See Fair, supra note 15. 
70 See BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
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India’s security forces’ response to the violence in Kashmir 
poses another significant layer of concern. India’s responses to 
Pakistan-backed separatism has included killings, tortures, and 
disappearances.75 These human rights violations are facilitated by law, 
as the Indian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) grants broad 
immunity to military personnel for human rights violations and 
additionally provides armed forces personnel with “special powers”76 
when operating in certain areas that must be classified as 
“disturbed.”77 Authorities have relied extensively on administrative 
detentions in the J&K region, with Amnesty International providing 
that, “[a]t its lowest, the percentage of administrative detainees (within 
the overall prison population) in J&K prisons was 11.5% (2008). This is 
over 14 times higher than the national average.”78 Additionally, the 
Public Safety Act (“PSA”) violates several international human rights 
laws and standards, as Amnesty International provided: 
The PSA violates international human rights law and 
standards by providing for detention without trial while denying the 
possibility of judicial review and other safeguards for those in 
detention required under international human rights law. It also 
violates the principle of legality by defining offences so broadly as to 
allow security officials to detain individuals on extremely vague 
 
75 Meenakshi Ganguly, India Needs to Step Back in Kashmir, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/12/india-needs-step-back-
kashmir#. 
76 The special powers concerned involve the right open fire if the officer is “of the 
opinion that it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of public order…”, arrest 
without warrant with at least reasonable suspicion, and to enter and search without 
warrant to make an arrest or recover a person or property wrongfully restrained or 
stolen. See Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, No. 28 of 1958, art. 4. 
77 The Act provides that ana rea may be disturbed if, “the Governor of Assam or the 
Chief Commissioner of Manipur is of the opinion that the whole or any part of the 
State of Assam or the Union Territory of Manipur, as the case may be, is in such a 
disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of the civil powers 
in necessary, he may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the whole or any 
part of the State or Union territory to be a disturbed area.” Id. See also Amnesty 
International, A ‘Lawless Law,” Detentions under the Jammu and Kashmir Public 
Safety Act, (March 2011), at 10. 
78 Amnesty International, supra note 77, at 12. 
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grounds including for exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and 
freedom of expression.79 
Thus, the aforementioned history paints a picture of India-
controlled Jammu and Kashmir up to the time of the writing of this 
article, notwithstanding Delhi’s recent decision to abrogate Articles 
370 and 35A. 
II. REMOVAL OF KASHMIR’S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS: 
ABROGATION OF ARTICLES 370 AND 35A OF THE INDIAN 
CONSTITUTION 
In August of 2019, the Indian Parliament passed, with 
President Ram Nath Kovin_’s signature, legislation to remove both 
Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution.80 The rationale behind 
the move cited the “temporary” nature of the provisions, economic 
development, and gender discrimination to back the abrogation.81 
Immediately, the decision proved controversial, as law professor and 
scholar Ali L. Khan noted, “[b]y revoking Articles 370 and 35A, India 
has seemingly abandoned the notion of J&K state as a special territory 
deserving autonomy.”82 Protests and debates about the 
constitutionality of the decision ensued. Several petitions were filed 
challenging the constitutionality of the abrogation, but the Supreme 
Court has sided with the government, affirming the constitutionality 
of the abrogation.83 
Whether the decision to remove Kashmir’s special protection 
status was constitutional is up for debate. Those who find the decision 
to be constitutional often draw upon a 1961 Indian Supreme Court 
decision, Puranlal Lakhanpal v. The President of India, to justify their 
 
79 Id. at 15. 
80 See Khan, supra note 48. 
81 Full text of document on govt.’s rationale behind removal of special status to J&K, 
THE HINDU (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/full-text-of-
document-on-govts-rationale-behind-removal-of-special-status-to-
jk/article28821368.ece. 
82 Khan, supra note 48. 
83 Murali Krishnan, Article 370 matter stays with 5-judge bench, SC accepts govt’s 
stand, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/no-need-for-larger-bench-rules-supreme-court-on-plea-on-scrapping-article-
370/story-OgFNM16BpwyvcQh5QswT7I.html. 
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position.84 There, the Indian Supreme Court held that the President of 
India may modify Constitutional provisions for its application to 
Kashmir.85 On the other hand, others underscore that the case may not 
provide for the sweeping application of India’s constitution to J&K 
altogether.86 Those who maintain that the abrogation of J&K’s special 
protection status was unconstitutional often rely upon the 1973 Indian 
Supreme Court decision, Kesavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala.87 There, 
the Indian Supreme Court found that the basic structure and principles 
of the Indian Constitution were not amendable through any process.88 
Therefore, some contend that Articles 370 and 35A are basic structures 
and principles of the Indian Constitution, and are therefore not 
amendable, let alone entirely revocable.89 In its response to petitions 
concerning the constitutionality of the decision, the Government of 
India focused on the fact that the provisions were always intended to 
be temporary.90 Furthermore, the Government’s affidavit in support of 
the abrogation provided, “[t]he militants and separatist elements, with 
the support of foreign forces inimical to India, were taking advantage 
of the situation and sowing discord, discontent, and even secessionist 
feelings among the populace of the State,” and that, “[w]hat is more, 
the residents of the erstwhile state were also being denied all the 
benefits of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India to all 
other citizens of the country.”91 Thus, there are competing arguments 
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on whether the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35AA was 
constitutional. 
III. DID THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLES 370 AND 35A VIOLATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Under international law, Kashmir’s special protection status 
granted an additional degree of autonomy. The previous legal 
framework provided Kashmiris greater control over their own laws 
relating to property, ownership, and other local issues, as well as the 
ability to determine the qualifications for permanent residency.92 This 
section will examine whether Kashmir has the right to enjoy this 
greater autonomy under general and customary international law. 
Specifically, this section will look to the international legal standards 
regarding autonomy regimes, minority rights, and the right to self-
determination. Lastly, this section will balance Kashmir’s right to self-
determination with India’s duty to protect under international law. 
A. KASHMIRIS’ RIGHT TO ENJOY AN AUTONOMY REGIME 
Autonomy regimes are defined as “regions of a State, usually 
possessing some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, which have been 
granted separate powers of internal administration, to whatever 
degree, without being detached from the State of which they are 
part.”93 Autonomy, specifically, is defined as, “a device to allow ethnic 
or other groups that claim a distinct identity to exercise direct control 
over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity 
to exercise those powers that cover common interests.”94 Autonomy 
may be granted under a variety of legal arrangements, as there exists 
no uniformity with respect to the terms and legal structures of 
autonomy.95 The creation of an autonomy regime is not derived from 
international law, but instead from the state’s own constitution or 
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legislation.96 Under general international law, there is generally no 
binding obligation for a state to create or to maintain an autonomy 
regime.97 Therefore, if specific provisions of a constitution or 
legislation concerning the autonomy regime is breached, generally, 
remedies are sought through the relevant domestic legal system.98 
One exception to this is when an autonomy regime is provided 
for under a bilateral treaty or a recommendation from an international 
organization.99 However, there are often dramatic political 
consequences that follow the abolishment of autonomy regimes. “An 
attempt to abolish unilaterally an autonomy regime is bound to have 
grave political reverberations . . . but, legally speaking, if the 
foundation of the autonomy regime is solely domestic, the State is only 
required to observe the strictures of its own legal system as regards to 
constitutional or legislative amendments . . . .”100 Resultantly, because 
of the lack of general international legal standards surrounding 
autonomy regimes, Kashmir likely does not hold the right to an 
autonomy regime under general international law. 
Additionally, Kashmir likely does not have the right to an 
autonomy regime under customary international law. There are 
several instances of autonomy regimes around the world. For example, 
Denmark created an autonomy regime for Greenland with the Home 
Rule Act of 1979, for which additional powers were granted to 
Greenland’s local government 30 years after it was created.101 
However, customary international law does not necessitate an 
obligation to create or maintain autonomy regimes once the regime is 
established. For instance, China did not honor promises of autonomy 
to Tibet, and neither did Sudan to its southern province.102 Moreover, 
once an autonomy regime is created, the international community is 
unlikely to intervene in the internal domestic affairs of the state.103 
However, Eritrea and Kosovo demonstrate that once a state grants an 
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autonomy regime and revokes it unilaterally, the abolition often 
radicalizes the situation and increases the likelihood of secession.104 
Thus, international law allows states to develop autonomy 
regimes, but international law does not provide that these autonomy 
regimes are irrevocable. Therefore, India did not breach any duty to 
maintain Kashmir’s autonomy regime by removing its special 
protection status. 
B. KASHMIRIS’ RIGHT TO MINORITY PROTECTIONS 
There is no international, unanimous definition of what 
constitutes a minority. Minority status is both a question of fact and 
encompasses objective and subjective factors.105 Minorities may be 
differentiated by one or more observable human characteristic, such as 
ethnicity, race, religion, caste, gender, socioeconomic status, ableness, 
or sexual orientation.106 Minority groups are often exposed to 
differential treatment within society, including discrimination based 
on perceived membership to the minority group.107 Discrimination 
against minority groups may also occur indirectly, as a result of 
unequal societal structures.108 
International law has set the foundations for minority groups’ 
collective right to autonomy. Article 27 of UN International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, (“ICCPR”) states that, “[i]n those States 
in which ethnic religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other minorities of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, or profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.”109 Scholar Rudiger Wolfrum interpreted this provision, 
noting that, “Article 27 has to be understood as providing a minimum 
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of protection against enforced integration or assimilation.”110 As 
scholar and professor Yoram Dinstein noted, “what contemporary 
international law rejects is the construct of an enforced national 
melting pot, which would deny protected minorities the right to be 
different from the majority of the population of the State in which they 
live.”111 
On December 18, 1992, the UN General Assembly issued a 
declaration, on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious or Linguistic Minorities which provided that: “States shall 
protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and 
shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.”112 The 
Declaration further highlights that: “Persons belonging to minorities 
have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national 
and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to 
which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a matter not 
incompatible with national legislation.”113 
Regional law is additionally increasingly trending towards 
providing minority groups’ rights to autonomy. For instance, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) 
Copenhagen Document, although not legally binding in itself, 
recognized that: “The participating States note the efforts taken to 
protect and create conditions for the promotion of ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by 
establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve the aims, 
appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the 
specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and 
in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.”114 However, 
Dinstein noted on this provision, “[i]t is striking that the text does not 
even include a ‘clear recommendation to establish autonomy.’”115 In 
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1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe drafted a 
proposed protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the rights of national 
minorities, where Article 11 provided: 
[I]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons 
belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their 
disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a 
special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation 
and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state.116 
However, this protocol was ultimately not adopted. Thus, 
although there is a growing trend towards recognizing that minorities 
have autonomy rights under international law, this right is still 
developing and not well-established. 
It is unlikely that Kashmiris hold minority status under 
international law. Historically, Kashmir was not separate from the 
remainder of the Indian subcontinent, and during British rule, it was 
treated as one of the princely states, similar to several current states of 
India. The primary distinguishing factor of Kashmir is its majority-
Muslim population—the only majority-Muslim population in India, 
aside from union territory, Lakshadweep. Because of Kashmir’s semi-
autonomous status within India prior to 2019, one could argue that 
Muslims were not a minority for legal purposes. Ironically, by 
abrogating Articles 370 and 35A, the Indian government has enabled 
the Kashmiri Muslim community to more easily claim minority status. 
However, although Kashmiri Muslims may be minorities under 
international law by virtue of being a Muslim community in Hindu-
majority India, the protections for minorities are likely not strong 
enough under international law to provide them with special 
protection status. 
C. KASHMIRIS’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
The right to self-determination is well-established under 
international human rights law. The right to self-determination is 
presented in Article 1 of the UN Charter, enacted in 1945, which 
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provides that: “The Purposes of the United Nations are . . . to develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . .”117 The right to self-
determination is also enshrined in the ICCPR: “All peoples have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.”118 Additionally, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) states 
in Article 1: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”119 Some 
international jurists have even argued that the right to self-
determination is so intrinsic to international human rights that it 
should be jus cogens.120 
There are two kinds of self-determination recognized under 
international law: internal self-determination and external self-
determination. External self-determination is a right which, “concerns 
the international status of a people,” specifically, “the recognition that 
each people has the right to constitute itself a nation-state or to 
integrate into or federate with, an existing state.”121 In international 
law, it is traditionally accepted that the external right to self-
determination only applies to circumstances in which a people is 
oppressed or the “mother state’s government does not legitimately 
represent the people’s interests . . . .”122 In contrast, internal self-
determination, “means only that the states should not, through 
appeals or pressure, seek to prevent people from freely selecting its 
own political, economic, and social system.”123 With respect to self-
determination of minorities, Max van der Stoel stated that because 
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external self-determination to minority groups in the world would 
prompt the creation of around 2,000 independent states, greater 
emphasis should instead be placed on internal self-determination to 
ensure that national minorities express their full identity and are able 
to live free and “achieve their aims, especially in the cultural and 
educational fields.”124 
It is doubtful that Delhi’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A 
violated Kashmir’s right to external self-determination under 
international law. The matter of external self-determination only 
applies if it is determined that the current population is oppressed.125 
This is a debatable position, especially because the abrogation 
integrates Kashmir with the remainder of India, so that the Indian 
Constitution applies to Kashmir like other Indian states and union 
territories.126 However, it is possible that Kashmiris’ right to internal 
self-determination may be violated under international law, as it is 
possible that the Muslim majority in Kashmir will be diluted, and 
India’s political power will be consolidated in the region.127 Moreover, 
now as a union territory, Kashmir is directly governed by the Central 
Government, without its own separate governing body.128 Thus, the 
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internal but not external right to self-determination may be implicated 
when India removed Kashmir’s special protection status.129 
 
D. BALANCING KASHMIR’S RIGHT TO INTERNAL SELF-
DETERMINATION WITH INDIA’S SECURITY RIGHTS AND DUTY TO 
PROTECT 
If India breached Kashmir’s right to internal self-
determination, this violation must be balanced with India’s duty to 
protect under international law, also known as humanitarian 
intervention. The responsibility to protect endows states with great 
discretion to take measures that might otherwise violate international 
legal standards. As the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect stated, “the responsibility to protect 
embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence 
and persecution.”130 Additionally, the UN has stipulated that, “the 
duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and 
foremost with the State, but the international community has a role 
that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty.”131 
The responsibility to protect has been affirmed in various 
international human rights documents, but it is a relatively recent 
concept. The 2005 World Outcome stipulated that, “each individual 
State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…the 
international community also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means…to help to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
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crimes against humanity.”132 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 
2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, which helps to 
operationalize the term, “responsibility to protect,” provides that the 
responsibility solely applies to four types of crimes and violations: 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.133 Ban Ki-moon’s report from 2012, Responsibility to protect 
– timely and decisive response, stipulated that “[t]he essence of 
‘responsibility while protecting’ is doing the right thing, in the right 
place, at the right time and for the right reasons. Timely and decisive 
action puts a premium on assessment, on understanding what is 
happening, why it is happening, and how the international 
community can help keep a difficult situation from becoming 
worse.”134 
Most relevant to the current Kashmir query is a series of 
measures that states can take in order to prevent atrocity crimes. The 
Secretary General’s report of 2013, Responsibility to protect: State 
responsibility and prevention, provided that “[c]onstitutional 
protections, when upheld, can contribute to creating a society based 
on non-discrimination.”135 Moreover, the report provided that “the 
diffusion and sharing of power can engender political pluralism, 
which promotes the peaceful coexistence of different interests.”136 The 
report also highlighted that atrocity crimes are more likely to take 
place during an armed conflict, and also established that societies with 
patterns of discrimination are risk factors, “[p]ersistent discrimination 
establishes divisions within society that serve both as a material cause 
and as a perceived justification of group violence. Without group-level 
discrimination, even deep-seated grievances are unlikely to transform 
into patterns of abuse that give rise to atrocity crimes.”137 
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The 2013 report also explained the role of gender 
discrimination in atrocity crimes, establishing that 
 
[g]ender discrimination and inequality increase 
underlying risks associated with sexual and gender-
based violence, which can constitute genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in some 
circumstances. Specific gender discrimination 
practices include the denial or inadequate protection of 
basic rights relating to physical security and the status 
of women, compulsory birth control, and access to 
services and property.138 
 
The report further provided that 
 
the risk of atrocity crimes is often connected to the 
presence of armed groups or militia and their capacity 
to commit atrocity crimes. Armed groups or militia 
may be allied with the State or a particular population 
sector. Associated risks include the proliferation of 
arms, including small arms, and the ability of armed 
groups to support their operations financially . . . .139 
 
Interestingly, all the aforementioned risk factors of armed 
conflict,140 gender-based discrimination,141 and armed groups allied 
with a particular population sector142 are present in the Kashmir 
predicament. 
Thus, one could argue that the level of conflict and 
discrimination present in the Kashmir region enabled India to revoke 
Kashmir’s special protection status, despite the potential breach of 
Kashmir’s right to self-determination. India may specifically argue 
that abrogating Articles 370 and 35A was an internationally lawful act 
because the risk of atrocity was high enough to justify taking 
 
138 Id. at ¶ 19. 
139 Id. at ¶ 22. 
140 BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9. 
141 Khullar, supra note 55. 
142 BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 11. 
2021 REMOVAL OF KASHMIR'S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS 517 
constitutional measures to ensure peace and security in the region.143 
Because states are afforded ample discretion when acting under the 
duty to protect, it is likely that such arguments would pass muster 
under international law. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The removal of Kashmir’s special protection status was likely 
an internationally lawful act. Kashmir’s special protection status 
essentially granted Kashmiris an autonomy regime. This article 
therefore examined three distinct theories: (1) the right to autonomy 
within an autonomy regime; (2) the right to autonomy under minority 
protections; and (3) the right to autonomy under self-determination. 
Lastly, this article balanced a potential breach of Kashmir’s self-
determination with India’s duty to protect and ensure peace and 
security. This article concludes that although rights to autonomy 
regimes, and minority rights more broadly, are developing under 
international law, they are currently too weak to provide Kashmir with 
irrevocable special protection status. The article additionally found 
that while India likely did not breach Kashmiris’ right to external self-
determination, it is possible that India’s actions will result in a 
violation of Kashmiris’ right to internal self-determination. Even so, it 
is unlikely that such a claim could succeed under international law, as 
India has great discretion under which to act within its duty to protect. 
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